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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ENFORCEABILITY OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS OF MINORS EIGHTEEN
YEaRs AND OVE.-Contracts of infants who have attained the age of
eighteen years, made after April 13, 1941, may not be disaffirmed on
the ground of infancy if undertaken in connection with a business in
which the infant was engaged and if reasonable and provident when
made, the burden to show that it was a reasonable and provident busi-
ness contract being on the person seeking to defeat disaffirmance.1
The enactment in its entirety results from recommendations of the
Law Revision Commission.
2
The stimulus to revision was the frequent one of judicial criti-
cism, in this case made in 1934 by Judge Crane in Sternlieb v. Nor-
tuandie National Securities Corporation,3 wherein it was noted that im-
providence is not a fault of minors only, and that many young people
who have the appearance of adults are forced by the circumstances
of our economy to engage in business at the peril of business men who
deal with them. Judge Crane pointed out that some states have
solved the problem by legislation. 4
Various proposals were thereupon made in the New York Legis-
lature,5 and thereafter the Law Revision Commission made a recom-
mendation to the Legislature of 19386 which included the provision
now enacted and two others later dropped by the Commission and
never enacted. These two proposals would have extended the with-
drawal of the power of disaffirmance to reasonable and provident
contracts made by the infant for the purposes of his education and to
contracts procured by the infant's written misrepresentation that he
was of full age. The legislation was finally recommended by the
Commission to the 1941 Legislature in the form in which it was
enacted.7
The law as it existed in New York before the enactment gave the
infant protection almost to an extreme.8 All his contracts were void-
able up to a reasonable time after he attained his majority 9 of twenty-
1 N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 260.
2 N. Y. LAW REVISION CoMMiSSION, Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65(B) pp. 1-8;
N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Leg. Doc. (1938) No. 65(I) pp. 1-67.
3 263 N. Y. 245, 250, 188 N. E. 726, 728 (1934) ; N. Y. LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, Leg. Doc- (1938) No. 65(I) pp. 11 and 47.
4 The case mentions the Iowa Code and includes within that group Kansas,
Utah and Washington. As a condition to disaffirmance a minor over eighteen
must restore the consideration or its equivalent in the states of California,
Idaho, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota under the enacted law of
those states. N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Leg. Doc. (1938) No. 65(I)
pp. 38-44.
5 N. Y. LAW REvisioN C mMISSION, Leg. Doc. (1938) No. 65(I) pp.
47-50 and cf. p. 7.
6Id. at p. 7.
,N. Y. LAW REVISION COmmission, Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65(B) p. 6.
8 Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E.
726 (1934); see (1940) 15 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 98.
9 Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E.
726 (1934); Healy v. Kellog, 145 N. Y. Supp. 943 (1914); International
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one years.10 Even his contracts for necessaries were not binding upon
him," although the statement has been frequently made that they
were.12 However, he is obligated quasi-restitutionally to the extent
of the reasonable value of necessaries actually supplied to him,' 3 and
Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 772 (1912); Continental
Nat Bank v. Strauss, 137 N. Y. 148, 32 N. E. 1066 (1893); Henry v. Root,
33 N. Y. 326 (1865). The common law in other large commercial states was in
accord: Mansfield v. Gordon, 144 Mass. 168, 10 N. E. 773 (1887) ; Holmes v.
Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N. E. 772 (1881) ; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Hiliard,
63 Ohio St. 478, 59 N. E. 230 (1900).
"ON. Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 2.
3" Ennis v. Beers, 84 Conn. 610, 80 At. 772 (1911); Shaw v. Coffin, 58
Me. 254 (1870); Earle v. Reed, 10 Metc. 387 (Mass. 1845); O'Donniley v.
Kinley, 220 Mo. App. 284, 286 S. W. 140 (1926) ; In re Soltykoff, 1 Q. B. D,
413 (1881); (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 1133; (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 498;-
1 AMEs, CASES ON BILLS AND NOTES 463, n.1; WHITNEY, CONTRACTS 10, n.21;
WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs § 240; WILLISTON, SALES § 21. In Shaw v. Coffin,
supra, and Earle v. Reed, supra, infant defendants were held not liable in
assumpsit upon a note given by them for necessaries. In the Soltykoff case,
supra, the infant was held not liable according to the customs of merchants
upon an acceptance of a bill of exchange drawn upon him for necessaries sold
to him. Thus the infant is not held, even for the price of necessaries, on his
promise.
12 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 240; WII.LISTON, SALES § 21. Mr. Williston
notes that misconception has led to some treatment of the infant's obligation
with respect to necessaries as "arising from the promise of the infant." For
such treatment, see Earle v. Reed, 10 Metc. 387 (Mass. 1845), wherein, while
holding that assumpsit for the full amount of a note given by an infant for
necessaries did not lie, the infant was held obligated in a.sumpsit in the same
action, as if on the note, for the reasonable value of the necessaries; O'Donniley
v. Kinley, 220 Mo. App. 284, 286 S. W. 140 (1926); (1940) 15 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 98.
13N. Y. PEgs. PROP. LAW §83 (UNIFORM SALES ACT §2); Ennis v.
Beers, 84 Conn. 610, 80 Atl. 772 (1911) ; Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527,
6 N. E. 761 (1886) ; O'Donniley v. Kinley, 220 Mo. App. 284, 286 S. W. 140
(1926); (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 1133; (1929) 43 HAgv. L. REv. 498; 1
AMES, CASES ON BILLS AND NOTES 463, n.1; EDGAR AND EDGAR, BILLS AND
NOTES 59 and n.45; WHITNEY, CoxTRAcTs 10, n.22; WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS§ 240; WILLISTON, SALES § 21. Even in such cases as Earle v. Reed, 10
Metc. 387 (Mass. 1845), though assumpsit for the reasonable value is held to
lie, the restitutional measure of damages indicates that the assumpsit is general
and not special, and hence that the obligation is quasi-contractual, and not truly
contractual or "on the promise.' In Shaw v. Coffin, 58 Me. 254 (1870), the
infant defendant had given a note for a sum of money to evidence his debt to
a person from whom the infant had stolen a chattel. In denying liability in
assumpsit (obviously special assumpit) upon the note, the court held the infant
liable in assumpit "for money had and received" for the value of the chattel
stolen, which is general or indebitatus assumpsit, that is, quasi-contract for
restitution. The promise of the note was thus rejected, and, with it, liability
in true contract. Citing WILLISTON, CoNllcts § 233, WILLISTON, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS STUDY COURSE § 158, DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS §§ 252-
254 and the Soltykoff case, supra, Messrs. Edgar and Edgar, in their BILLS
AND NOTES, 59, say, "Negotiable instruments made by infants are at least
voidable, and even though an infant is liable for the reasonable value of neces-
saries, such obligation still remains in quasi-contract, there is no liability in
pure contract, and so there is no liability on any negotiable instrument given
for the same * * *." In O'Donniley v. Kinley, supra, the court thought the
point so important that it quoted from 14 R. C. L. 255 as follows: "It is,
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the fact that lie is bound at all seems to be the explanation underlying
the common error that he is bound upon the promise.14
Great though the protection given to infants has been, it has
undergone some limitation where a continuing account consisting of
a series of transactions has been involved. For example, upon an
infant's rescission of his relationship with a firm of stock brokers, all
of the acts -of the brokers having been authorized by the infant, he
has been held not entitled to recover the value of securities turned
over to them as fixed at the time of the transfer, but only the posses-
sion of such securities as remain with the brokers and the proceeds
of securities sold at the infant's order.'5
Though, upon the exercise of his power of disaffirmance, the in-
fant is under a restitutional obligation to the adult, the infant will not
be denied rescission if he has squandered the consideration he received
from the adult.'8 Thus we see the extreme to which protection has
gone.
However, upon disaffirmance by an infant of a contract of pur-
chase of consumer goods, the adult has been held entitled to an off-
set for the depreciation in value caused by use,' 7 and, in another case,
to an offset for damages sustained to the goods while in the infant's
possession.' 8
Though the power of disaffirmance may be exercised before the
infant reaches his majority, affirmance cannot be accomplished until
he has attained it.' 9
As is implicit in Judge Crane's criticism 20 of the former state
of the law, our society and its economy have outgrown much of what
made necessary the law as it existed to "protect infants or minors
from their own improvidence and folly, and to save them from the
depredations and frauds practiced upon them by the designing and
unprincipled * * *." 21 Minors possessed of capacity, as an actual
fact and in all eyes except those of the law, have been enabled to use
their power of disaffirmance as a device by which they escaped even
however, inaccurate, strictly speaking, to say that the infant's contract if for
necessaries, is valid and binding upon him. The more accurate statement is,
that he is liable to pay the reasonable value of such necessaries as he has
purchased and received; or, as it is sometimes expressed, he is liable on the
implied contract, but not on the express contract which he made."
14 O'Donniley v. Kinley, 22 Mo. App. 284, 286 S. W. 140 (1926). See
also WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 240; WILLISTON, SALES § 21.
15 Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N. Y. 241, 181 N. E. 464 (1932).
16 Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 241, 181 N. E. 553 (1877).
17 Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899).
Is Wheeler & Watson Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 2 Misc. 236, 21 N. Y. Supp.
1006 (1893).
29 WHITNEY, CONTRACTs 12, wherein it is noted that a ratification accom-
plished while the disability exists cannot have any greater validity than the
original obligation.
20 Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E.
726 (1934).
21 Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526, 536 (1865).
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the ordinary risks of trade while yet they engaged in it.22 With the
risk wholly upon the other and adult contracting party, not only is
our notion of what is just offended, but also our economy suffers.
Infants who must engage in trade to support themselves should be
permitted to do so. But the state, which owes fair safeguards to all
its citizens and not to infants alone, and necessarily must interest it-
self in the general economy of our society besides, has the power, and
has wisely exercised it in this enactment, to dictate terms upon which
infants may engage in business without extraordinary peril to adults
who are also engaged in business.
Perhaps the most noteworthy fact in the history of this legisla-
tion was the elimination of the provisions with respect to contracts
relating to education and those induced by misrepresentations con-
cerning age. Whatever of value those provisions would have in our
economy seems understandably to fall short of sufficient weight to
produce favorable legislative action upon them. The greater impor-
tance of the provision finally enacted is apparent, and it is obvious
that a social problem of serious degree is not found to exist in the
situations which the rejected provisions would have remedied. Few
indeed are written misrepresentations of age, however many verbal
inducements of that sort infants may make in a given period of time.23
Few, too, are contracts made and broken by infants with respect to
their education, and fewer still those from whose breach flows serious
harm. Many if not most "pay" secondary schools, more collegiate
centers, and all universities, are charitable corporations, whose inter-
ests transcend profit and loss.
Since it is true that in the fulfillment of their respective func-
tions, the Law Revision Commission proposes and the legislature dis-
poses, the final form of the enactment is what might have been
expected.
The enacted law of New York had, prior to the adoption of the
statute under discussion, dealt with various disabilities based on non-
age. An infant's cancellation of a policy of insurance upon his life,
taken out by him when he was not less than fourteen and one-half
years of age, for the benefit of his father, mother, brother, sister, hus-
band, wife, child, children or grandparent, does not entitle him to
recover back all premiums paid with interest, but only the cash sur-
render value and other stipulated benefits, and he may give a valid
22 C. N. Bank v. Strauss, 137 N. Y. 148, 32 N. E. 1066 (1893) ; Sparman
v. Keim, 83 N. Y. 245 (1880); Whittemore v. Elliott, 7 Hun 518 (N. Y.
1876) ; Yates v. Lyon, 61 N. Y. 344 (1874) ; Slocum v. Hooker, 13 Barb. 536
(N. Y. 1852). But cf. Mutual Milk & Cream v. Prigge, 112 App. Div. 652,
98 N. Y. Supp. 458 (1st Dep't 1936), in which the infant, having left the
plaintiff's employ, was enjoined from soliciting business from plaintiff's cus-
tomers in violation of his employment contract; Vichnes v. Transcontinental &
Western Air, Inc., 173 Misc. 631, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 603 (1940).
23 The latter, of course, could not safely be reached, it is feared, for the
fact of the infant's deception would too strongly tempt many an adult to
perjure himself in what he would justify in his mind as a sort of self-defense.
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discharge therefor.24 The age of complete valid consent to marriage
is fixed at eighteen, annulment (upon the ground of non-age) of a
marriage earlier contracted being a matter of judicial discretion. 25
Transfers by infants of negotiable instruments are effective to pass
the "ownership" thereof.26 Innocent purchasers of goods 27 and inno-
cent transferees of stock certificates for value 28 from sellers whose
"title" is voidable because of the infancy of a former "owner" are
not subject to the infant's power of disaffirmance.
In reacting deliberately and sensitively to the felt needs of the so-
ciety it serves, the legislative process has hardly more than begun its
work when an enactment reaches the statute books. It is the courts
who, in construing its meaning, will say how it operates to remedy the
condition whose correction was designed, and the construction which
they will place upon it will probably be that which will accomplish
the desired amelioration without too much regard for the mere dic-
tionary meanings of words.
29
Though the enactment under consideration is in derogation of
the common law, we may expect that the judicial attitude toward it
will not be too strict, since the pressure for liberal construction is very
great. For one thing, there is the fact that the criticisms leveled at
the pre-existing law have been joined in by the judges themselves,
which is exemplified by the opinion of Judge Crane 30 to which pre-
vious reference has been made. For another, there is our society's
consciousness of the truth which lies in those criticisms. We are all
aware that our economy has compelled minors in large numbers to
engage in business. We know, too, that the retention until now of
the infant's power to disaffirm in all cases has enabled these infants
to escape even the ordinary hazards of trade by adding these risks
to the normal perils of the adult tradesman. Since our society feels
it to be true that transactions for profit are the basis of our economy,
and knows that these transactions in their turn are engaged in for
the reason that they involve correlative risks and opposed hopes of
profit, legal precepts which permit those risks to be entirely unilateral
could not survive in our economy. The construction of the enact-
ment under discussion, then, can be expected to proceed toward the
result that the risks of trade between infants and adults be normally
and healthfully bilateral. Such is the case for reasonably liberal
construction.
24 N. Y. INsURANcE LAW § 145; Harnm v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 App.
Div. 504, 122 N. Y. Supp. 35 (1910).
25 N. Y. DoMsEsTIc RELATIONS LAW § 7, subd. 1.
26 N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 41.
27 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 105 (UNIFORM SALE OF GOODS AcT § 2);
Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924).
28 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 169.
29 CURTIS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1916) §§ 51-66, 73-
75, 91-97; 1 McKINNEY, CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 39.
30 In Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 250,
188 N. E. 726, 728 (1934).
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The problems which the statute will present may be expected to
revolve around the meaning of three groups of words. Specifically
they will be what is meant by (1) "a business in which the infant
was engaged", (2) a contract "made in connection with" such a
business and (3) "reasonable and provident".
(1) The difficulties presented by the first of these may not be
many, for the ordinary meaning of business as a pursuit engaged in
for profit and consisting of more than a few sporadic transactions
will undoubtedly become the general test. However, there may be a
problem, presented by the feeling of need for liberal construction, as
to whether or not a single contract, which would clearly be a busi-
ness contract if it did not stand alone, may constitute doing business.
This raises a point with respect to the possibility that there may be an
attempt to bring within the section the first contract made by an in-
fant with the intention of engaging in business. If, for example, it
be held that evidence of being engaged in business is the making of
various business contracts, some contracts which cannot be enforced
under the enactment will have to be made, and perhaps breached with-
out relief, before the infant can be held liable on later ones.
(2) The question of what contracts are made "in connection
with such a business" will probably give the courts trouble. For ex-
ample, if a partnership in which an infant was a member is sued upon
a contract it has made, is the partnership a contract "made in con-
nection with the business in which the infant was engaged"? If the
answer is in the affirmative, how will problems of the adult plaintiff's
right to discovery and inspection, including examination before trial,
be solved so as to enable the adult to meet his burden on the question
of whether or not the partnership "contract" was reasonable and
provident when made? Again, if the business is buying and selling,
are only contracts of purchase and sale within the statute or will its
operation include contracts of the infant by which he employs his
help, rents his space and hires a truck with driver? The probability
of liberal construction suggests that the broader solution will be
adopted.
(3) With respect to the meaning of "reasonable and provident",
whatever clash of ideas is to be expected will probably involve mat-
ters of degree rather than of substance. Settlement, crystallization,
are less likely to be had than compromise through the application of
the ordinary test for a jury question: When reasonable men can
draw conflicting inferences about whether or- not the contract is rea-
sonable and provident, the jury will do the deciding.
A minor problem, which will undoubtedly be among the first to
be settled, may be found to exist in the meaning of the phrase "bur-
den of proof" in subdivision 2 of the enactment. Will the phrase be
held to mean what it says, that is, to refer to the ultimate substantive
burden of proof? Or does it relate merely to coming forward with
1941 ]
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the evidence? 3 1 This will not be so important in the ordinary case
in which the adult will be the plaintiff, for both burdens as to all
matters including this will then be upon the adult on general prin-
ciples. It will, however, be important in such a case as one in which
the infant is suing upon a rescission, for example, to regain what con-
sideration he gave up under the contract. There the infant's position
as a plaintiff places upon him both the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of proof as to other matters than those relating to the
question of whether the contract is "reasonable and provident". Ob-
viously, the burden of producing evidence that the contract was "rea-
sonable and provident" will be upon the adult defendant.32 But can
it also be held that, upon this question, he has the ultimate burden of
proof? 33
Ours is the largest and most important business state. It is sur-
prising that it was not 3 4 one of the pioneers in the direction of pro-
tecting the business community against the unrestrained exercise by
infants of their legal power to disaffirm their contracts.
The historian of the future may find it noteworthy that the same
session which enacted the statute under discussion, by making it pos-
sible validly to grant land adversely held against the grantor,35 put a
p.actical end to the modern importance of seisin, and completed legal
recognition of the fact that in our economy land is a commodity.36
L. DEL VECCHIO.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 20 - LIABILITIES OF SPECIFIC
LEGATEES OF ENCUMBERED PERSONAL PROPERTY.-At common law
one who was given a specific legacy burdened with a debt, was en-
titled to have the debt paid out of the general assets of the estate, to
the exoneration of the property specifically bequeathed, unless the
31 See Hood v. Webster, 271 N. Y. 57, 59, 2 N. E. (2d) 43, 44 (1936).
32 Ibid.
33 See Hood v. Webster, 271 N. Y. 57, 59, 2 N. E. (2d) 43, 44 (1936).
The adult having introduced even slight evidence, will the burden pass to the
infant, on the ground that the matter is particularly within his own knowledge?
Perine v. Elmira, C. & W. Ry., 184 App. Div. 814, 172 N. Y. Supp. 396 (3d
Dep't 1918).
34 The following states have dealt with some phase of the infants' contracts
by statute: (1) The Iowa group: Iowa, Kansas, Utah and Washington; (2)
The Field Code group: California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma
and South Dakota; (3) Requirement of a writing: Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina and Virginia; (4) Removal
of disabilities of infancy: Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Tennessee and Texas; (5) Miscellaneous: Georgia, Louisiana and Virginia.
35 N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 260, amended by L. 1941, c. 317.
36 Guest, et al. v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478, 18 Am. Rep. 570 (1873) ; Booth v.
Rome, W. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893); Myers v.
Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 (N. Y. 1851); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N. Y.
1838); Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261 (N. Y. 1835); 3 KaNT'S Comm. 537.
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